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Lawyers as Advocate-Negotiators 
T h e last decade has been one of substantial turmoil for the mental health 
system. This has been especially so in regard to the delivery of nonvoluntary 
mental health care. Critics from within and without the mental health pro-
fessions have challenged the long-accepted philosophical foundations for 
compelling some persons to undergo treatment despite their protestations. 
I n addition, there have been numerous changes in the legal framework for 
the provision of nonvoluntary care. Some of these changes have been legis-
lative innovations, but many—perhaps most—^have been the direct or i n -
direct results of court orders following litigation based on alleged constitu-
tional deficiencies in the existing systems. 
One phenomenon that is to some extent the cause of and to some degree 
the result of these recent developments has been the recent tendency of law-
yers to undertake an increasingly active role in mental health matters. Many 
mental health professionals find this new lawyer activism more difiicult to 
understand and accept than the other changes that have occurred. Mental 
health personnel are both confounded and angered when lawyers pursue wi th 
vigor and skill objectives which the mental health workers believe—and 
which the lawyers frequently acknowledge—are inconsistent with the long-
term "best interests" of the person involved. 
The relationship between the new activist lawyers and mental health pro-
fessionals tends to be an especially stormy one because it is through the 
lawyers' day-to-day efforts on behalf of their clients that the considerable 
changes that have been mandated for the mental health system are imple-
mented so as to have a direct impact on the mental health workers. 
This monograph explores several aspects of the new activist attorneys' 
behavior that may assist others in better understanding this relatively new 
breed of lawyer. Decisions that lawyers must make in defining their role in 
mental health matters and the reasons for the trend towards a "new" resolu-
tion of those decisions are examined. I t is clear, however, that there are still 
significant impediments to universal acceptance of this activist role, and these 
hindrances are considered as wel l . A n effort is then made to explain what the 
activist lawyers are doing and w h y they are undertaking these tasks in an 
effort to fulfill what they see as their newly recognized responsibilities. 
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Role Definition 
Tradit ionally—and currently, in many jurisdictions—lawyers have per-
ceived themselves as having only a limited role in mental health proceedings. 
Although lawyers have been provided for proposed patients in c iv i l "commit-
ment" proceedings, these lawyers have generally done little more than repre-
sent the proposed patient during the actual court hearing. Moreover, during 
these proceedings the lawyers have regarded themselves as having the 
right—and even the duty—of making their own determination of whether 
the proposed treatment would be in the "best interests" of their clients and, 
if it would be, of not vigorously contesting the case. 
T h e lawyer, in other words, has functioned much as a guardian, exercising 
the power to make critical decisions concerning the litigation for his client 
and then proceeding to implement those decisions. Andalman and Chambers, 
in "Effective Counsel for Persons Fac ing Commitment: A Survey, A Polemic, 
and A Proposal," Mississippi Law Journal, Vol . 45, page 43, at page 72, after 
investigating the performance of lawyers in mental health proceedings, gave 
the following description of attorneys' participation in several states: 
The attorneys did not in any way regard themselves as advocates 
and (partly as a consequence) failed to develop the knowledge or 
perform the work necessary to aid their clients. Indeed, they did 
virtually nothing except stand passively at a hearing and add a 
falsely reassuring patina of respectability to the proceedings. 
I f , for some reason, a lawyer was moved actively to resist the proceedings 
on behalf of his client, his efforts have traditionally been limited to courtroom 
advocacy of the traditional sort. Often the lawyer would do no more than 
strive desperately to discredit the psychiatric witnesses by finding minor i n -
consistencies in their description of the patient or his symptoms. Although 
this behavior corresponded reasonably wel l with the layman's image of an 
effective lawyer, it was seldom effective in persuading the judge or jury. I t 
therefore was of little value to the proposed patient. 
This perception of lawyers' role has recently been subject to increasing 
challenge. Lawyers participating in mental health litigation have become 
sensitive to the need to make two critical decisions concerning the nature of 
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their participation. One requires them to choose between the traditional 
"guardian" role and what might best be described as an "advocate" role. I n 
the latter, the attorney's ultimate professional responsibility is to use al l 
legitimate methods to pursue objectives defined by the client, rather than 
assuming responsibility for defining those objectives. The second decision re-
quires a choice between the traditional "litigator" role in which the lawyer's 
major function is in-court representation and the "negotiator s" role, in which 
the lawyer also attempts to achieve the client's objectives by informal ne-
gotiation and bargaining. 
Several interrelated but nevertheless distinguishable factors have been re-
sponsible for lawyers' recent tendency to resolve these questions more fre-
quently in favor of an "advocate-negotiator" role. 
Constitutional Mandate 
A major aspect of the changes in the mental health system's legal frame-
work has been the incorporation into that framework of procedural rights for 
the proposed patient. These have often been rights developed in criminal 
litigation and inserted—sometimes with modification to accommodate the 
different context—into the mental health system. The assumption upon which 
this incorporation has been based is that proceedings to compel a person to 
submit to treatment are "adversary" proceedings. Under this premise, an ac-
curate outcome is best assured by providing a proposed patient wi th the 
opportunity to stimulate that clash of opposing views which w i l l result in ful l 
exploration of al l possible positions and the ultimate selection of the best 
solution. 
Several courts have held that one of those rights to which a proposed 
patient is constitutionally entitled is representation by a lawyer who perceives 
his role as that advocate. A federal District Court in Alabama stated the basic 
proposition as follows: 
T h e right to counsel is a right to traditional counsel occupying a tra-
ditional adversarial role. Where state law requires or permits the 
appointment of a guardian ad litum, such appointment shall be 
deemed to satisfy the constitutional right to counsel if , but only if, 
the appointed guardian is a licensed attorney and occupies a truly 
adversary position. 
L y n c h v. Baxley, 386 F . Supp. 378, 389 ( M . D . A la . 1974) . There is increas-
ing recognition, then, that a lawyer who fails to structure his role as that of 
an advocate violates one of the client's federal constitutional rights. Since 
vigorous and skillful advocacy is often essential to the implementation of 
other procedural rights available to a proposed patient, it is arguable that this 
right to representation by an advocate is the most important of those de-
veloped in recent reform efforts. 
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Professional Ethical Standards 
Recent consideration—prompted no doubt in part by the judicial decisions 
discussed above—^has suggested to many lawyers that vigorous pursual of 
the advocate role is not only consistent wi th but mandated by long-recognized 
professional standards. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 
adopted by the American Bar Association, states that "the duty of a lawyer, 
both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously 
within the bounds of the law" . But it also recognizes that the lawyer's role i n -
cludes advising the client on matters of judgment: 
A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his 
client are made only after the client has been informed of relevant 
consideration. . . . A lawyer ought to initiate this decision-making 
process if the client does not do so. Advice of a lawyer to his client 
need not be confined to purely legal considerations. A lawyer should 
advise his client of the possible effect of each legal alternative. 
I t is clear, then, that the advocate's role does not prohibit an attorney from 
advising a proposed patient that hospitalization or other treatment would, in 
the attorney's judgment, be appropriate and helpful. T o the contrary, an 
attorney representing a proposed patient who seeks to resist hospitalization 
has a recognized duty to advise his client concerning the attorney's judgment 
as to whether resistance would be wise. 
But it is also well-established that in regard to matters substantially affect-
ing the right of the client, the client holds the ultimate power of decision-
making. According to Canon 7, "the authority to make decisions [affecting 
the merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client] is 
exclusively that of the client and, if made within the framework of the law, 
such decisions are binding on the lawyer." T h e duty to counsel a client as wel l 
as to pursue his ultimate decision is caveated by the warning that " i n the 
final analysis, however, the lawyer should always remember that the decision 
whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-
legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself." I n practical 
terms, this means that the lawyer maintains sole authority to make tactical 
and procedural decisions, such as what witnesses to cal l and what objections 
and motions to make. But the client must make such basic decisions as 
whether to resist actively efforts to compel h im to submit to treatment, 
whether to demand a jury trial if one is available, and—if a choice is avai l -
able—whether to take the witness stand and testify in his own behalf. Whi le 
the lawyer may advise the client on these matters, he must take care not to 
characterize inaccurately the alternatives or to impede the client's ability to 
make an independent choice. Given the fact that proposed patients are often 
emotionally and intellectually impaired, the need to avoid overbearing their 
decision-making capacity is especially great and, i n many cases, presents an 
unusually difficult task for the lawyer. T h e most that can helpfully be said as 
a general matter is that the lawyer's role as advocate does not affect his role 
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as counsellor, but in mental health proceedings lawyers need to be excep-
tionally sensitive to their duty to avoid overbearing the w i l l of clients likely 
to be susceptible to such influences. 
Does the fact that the client may be mentally i l l and substantially impaired 
affect the application of general professional standards to the lawyer's role 
in mental health proceedings? Some have argued that this characteristic of 
mental health proceedings has no significance. The purpose of the proceed-
ings, it is asserted, is to determine whether the proposed patient is mentally 
i l l and, if so, sufficiently disabled to bring him within the group of persons 
who w i l l be compelled to submit to treatment. T o modify the lawyers role 
on the basis of an assumption concerning the outcome of the proceeding 
would be to depreciate the proceeding itself in unacceptable fashion. 
But the Code of Professional Responsibility suggests that the answer is 
not so simple. Canon 7 states that "the responsibilities of a lawyer may vary 
according to the intelligence . . . [or] mental condition . . . of a client" and 
"any menta l . . . condition of a client that renders him incapable of making a 
considered judgment in his own behalf casts additional responsibilities upon 
his lawyer." The Canon then specifies that if a client is under disability and 
has no formally appointed guardian, the lawyer may be compelled to make 
certain decisions on behalf of the client. The section closes, however, wi th the 
admonition, " B u t obviously a lawyer cannot perform any act or make any 
decision which the law requires his client to perform or make." The meaning 
of this language is not entirely clear. I t is best read, however, as simply 
recognizing that the fact that the client's mental health and emotional or i n -
tellectual capacity has been challenged has no effect upon the need for the 
client to make the basic decisions identified earlier. A lawyer's conscientious 
determination that the client's judgment is impaired may, however, increase 
the number of non-fundamental tactical decisions the lawyer may make and 
decrease the obligation to consult with the client before making them. A 
lawyer who believes, after adequate inquiry, that his client's judgment is 
substantially impaired may have less of an ethical obligation to consult wi th 
the client concerning which witness to cal l and how vigorously to cross 
examine witnesses presented by the other side. H e sti l l , however, may not 
decide for the client whether or not to contest the proceedings, and his client's 
impairment probably increases his need to avoid overbearing his client's 
capacity while providing advice on whether or not to resist hospitalization 
efforts. 
Practicality 
Once lawyers began to take seriously the task of assisting proposed pa-
tients in avoiding treatment, i t became clear that this could not be performed 
simply by courtroom advocacy. There were, of course, numerous models 
available for providing a broader range of services for the client. Pretrial 
compromise settlements in c iv i l litigation are common, and an attorney is 
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often able to maximize his client's benefits by this means rather than going 
through a trial . I n the majority of criminal cases, the chances of winning a 
trial are so remote that it is seldom to a client's advantage to litigate the 
matter. I n such situations, the lawyer's function is often best performed by 
assisting the client in making an attractive case for a lenient sentence. This 
may involve assisting the client in obtaining a job or enrolling in a vocational 
training course. Advocacy, in these situations, is performed by negotiation 
and careful preparation of a nonlegal case. 
I t was inevitable, then, that lawyers who took seriously their advocate's 
role would become negotiators as wel l as litigators. This function involved at 
least two distinguishable types of activity. T h e first includes efforts to imple-
ment " legal" rights, but by informal means. The lawyer may, for example, 
seek to participate in the client's evaluation by a mental health facility in an 
effort to persuade the examiners that the client does not meet the legal 
standard for commitment. This effort, of course, is aimed at winning the 
"legal" issue of whether there is sufficient proof but to do so without the 
necessity of formal trial . The second type of activity consists of attempts to 
maximize a client's advantage by non-legal methods. A lawyer representing a 
client whose hospitalization is sought by the client's spouse, for example, 
may attempt to find resources for the family unit to enable the family to 
accept the client back and to persuade them to do so, even though there may 
be sufiicient evidence available to justify hospitalization. This plan amounts 
to securing for a client an advantage to which he has no identifiable legal 
right but which, as a practical matter, is available to him in some situations. 
Activity of both sorts often involves cooperation with mental health per-
sonnel and active participation in nonjudicial stages of the mental health 
system. But in many cases this effort enables the lawyer to implement more 
effectively the client's desires than would be possible by even the most ef-
fective courtroom techniques. 
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Barriers to Effective Fulfillment of Advocate-Negotiator Bole 
Despite the growing acknowledgement of the theoretical desirability of the 
advocate-negotiator role, i t is clear that lawyers representing proposed pa-
tients do not always so define their duties to their clients. Some explanations 
are relatively simple. I f a proposed patient is so uncommunicative that he ex-
presses no discernable views, the incentive to undertake vigorous representa-
tion of the person is greatly reduced. T o some extent, inertia is influential. A 
major change in role requires that long accepted practices be abandoned, 
often with diificulty. But there are also more important factors that need to 
be addressed specifically because of their tendency to increase the difficulty 
of fulfilling what is increasingly recognized as the legally and ethically re-
quired role of a lawyer. 
F i rs t of these considerations is lack of knowledge. Mental health diagnosis 
and care are specialized areas with which many lawyers have no more than 
passing familiarity. I f a recognized mental health professional asserts that a 
proposed patient "needs" hospitalization, a lawyer with little background in 
the area is often quite uncomfortable in undertaking to challenge this as-
sertion. Effective performance of the negotiator role requires that the lawyer 
be able to discuss diagnosis, treatment techniques, and community resources. 
L a c k of such ability discourages and precludes lawyers from undertaking 
effective advocacy in this fashion. The matter is aggravated by the absence 
of circumstances encouraging the development of familiarity wi th the back-
ground information necessary for effective advocacy. Mental health proceed-
ings are relatively infrequent and often involve proposed patients with 
minimal financial resources. There is little financial incentive for lawyers to 
develop in this area the expertise that exists in such fields as patent and com-
munication law. Young attorneys asked to undertake mental health cases once 
or twice a year have little incentive to build up a body of background i n -
formation for these cases, since they w i l l seldom find use for it in other areas 
of their practice. This has a dual effect. I t discourages lawyers from chal-
lenging mental health experts, an essential factor to the advocate role. I n 
addition, it reduces the effectiveness of those lawyers who, despite the dis-
couragement, nevertheless undertake vigorous representation of the wishes of 
the proposed patient. 
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A second factor is the ambivalence experienced by many lawyers concern-
ing their role. Assumption of the advocate role requires a lawyer to resist with 
al l professional skills the compulsory treatment of proposed patients he or she 
may believe would be benefited by the proposed treatment. Natural humani-
tarian impulses often make this an uncomfortable task. Undoubtedly many 
lawyers are unwilling to completely suppress such impulses, and as a result 
they may accept a compromise role perspective somewhat closer to the 
guardian role than that the advocate described earlier. 
A third barrier is the frequent absence of vigorous representation for the 
"other side." Recent reform efforts have sometimes resulted in the provision 
of adversary representation for the proposed patient but not equally moti-
vated or skilled representation for the person or institution seeking involun-
tary care. As a result, counsel for a proposed patient may anticipate winning 
for reasons unrelated to the merits of the proposed patient's case. For ex-
ample, the absence of a crucial witness because of the lack of preparation of 
opposing counsel may result in a victory because those seeking involuntary 
care have not been able to establish certain facts which counsel for the pro-
posed patient knows to be true. 
The advocate's role is justified on the ground that the most nearly "correct" 
disposition of a case is likely to arise from a vigorous clash of conflicting 
views; the role—and responsibility—of those presenting the conflicting views 
need not go beyond this task of presentation. But where equality of repre-
sentation does not exist, the justification for assigning defense counsel no 
responsibility for the outcome of the proceeding disappears. A number of 
lawyers undoubtedly are dissuaded from unqualified acceptance of the ad-
vocate role because they perceive the mental health system as one in which a 
clash of equally skilled and prepared advocates is not assured and therefore 
one in which adoption of the advocate role creates an unacceptable risk of 
inaccurate results. 
A final element militating against adoption of a "pure" advocate role is re-
sistance by other participants in the mental health system. T r i a l judges who 
actually hear litigated cases are likely to be especially influential. The power 
of a trial judge is vast and largely immune from efforts at control. A local trial 
judge who opposes vigorous advocacy on behalf of proposed patients may 
exert considerable informal influence upon lawyers, tending to discourage 
them from adopting this role. A young lawyer, struggling to develop a prac-
tice, may find such pressure impossible to resist. E v e n i f the lawyer is wil l ing 
to ignore efforts to discourage him from performing as an advocate, the fact 
that the trial judge disapproves of rigorous advocacy of proposed patients 
may require the lawyer, in the best interests of his clients, to adopt a modified 
role, at least when appearing before the judge. T h e best possible repre-
sentation of a proposed patient who may come before such a judge often 
consists of avoiding direct confrontation in open court and instead pursuance 
of other methods, such as informal negotiations with the institutional staff. 
These factors explain to some extent the relatively common reluctance of 
lawyers to accept the advocate-negotiator role without qualification. Some of 
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the factors represent defects in the legal system that should be modified: 
lawyers should be compensated adequately to enable them to prepare ef-
fectively for litigation; adequate representation should be provided for those 
persons seeking hospitalization of others as wel l as for proposed patients; 
trial judges should not use their discretionary power to impede the perform-
ance of proper roles by lawyers. At least one factor suggests that inadequate 
consideration may have been given to the desirability of establishing those 
"rights" which an advocate-negotiator must pursue for his client. Insofar as 
conscientious lawyers continue to experience ambivalence when confronted 
with the task of implementing a relatively narrow standard for determining 
which mentally i l l persons w i l l be compelled to undergo treatment, the pro-
priety of that narrow standard seems to be called into question. T h e dis-
comfort experienced by lawyers who must actually enforce these standards 
on a day-to-day basis may be a reasonably accurate indicator of the accept-
ability of these standards to the community at large. I t does seem clear that 
until defects in the legal system are repaired and until it becomes widely-
accepted that narrow commitment standards are based upon sound consid-
erations, there w i l l continue to be strong pressures upon lawyers to avoid ful l 
embrace of the advocate-negotiator role. 
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Implementing the Advocate-Negotiator Role 
H o w might a lawyer who concludes that duty requires him to perform as 
an advocate-negotiator seek to fulfill this responsibility? A basic understand-
ing of the mental health litigation process is a necessary prerequisite to any 
discussion of the opportunities it presents to such lawyers. Although pro-
cedures differ to some extent from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, most follow a 
common pattern. 
Proposed patients are usually first hospitalized under "emergency" au -
thority that requires no court approval or, if court approval is necessary, no 
formal hearing. A petition is then filed for formal proceedings leading to long-
term treatment. After the initial admission, an opportunity for a formal court 
hearing is extended. This hearing is likely to be held within several days or 
weeks from the initial admission. A t the hearing, a right to jury trial may or 
may not be available, depending upon the law of the jurisdiction. Testimony 
is taken from sworn witnesses. The judge—or the jury, i f the case is tried to 
a jury—determines whether the evidence proves that the proposed patient 
meets the standard set out by state law determining which persons may be 
compelled to submit to treatment. I n some jurisdictions, the petitioner must 
prove that the proposed patient is "dangerous to himself or others", while in 
others it is sufficient if it is established that the proposed patient is " i n need 
of care and treatment". T h e criteria differ widely in phraseology. 
Traditionally, the only option available to the court i f it was determined 
that the proposed patient met the statutory standard was to order full-time 
hospitalization. I n an increasingly large number of jurisdictions, however, the 
court is given the alternative of ordering the person to submit to treatment 
programs not involving full-time institutionalization, such as day-care pro-
grams or even out-patient therapy. T h e old term "commitment", insofar as it 
implies court-ordered hospitalization, is no longer an accurate description 
of mental health proceedings in many jurisdictions. 
I n most jurisdictions, a proposed patient who is found to meet the statutoiy 
standard and is ordered to submit to treatment may appeal the decision of 
the trial court to an appellate court. The appeal is "on the record." This 
means that the appellate court considers only the testimony and evidence 
that was presented before the trial court. No new testimony is taken before 
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the appellate court, although both written and oral arguments may be pre-
sented before this tribunal. The appellate court does not decide any issues as 
if they were before it for the first time, but rather reviews the documents in 
the case and the transcription of the testimony to determine whether errors 
were committed by the trial court. 
A proposed patient or his family may, of course, retain an attorney to rep-
resent the proposed patient, and such a privately-retained lawyer may enter 
the proceedings at any time. But most mental health proceedings involve i n -
digent proposed patients who are unable to hire their own attorneys. Lawyers 
are uniformly provided for such proposed patients—the lawyers are "ap-
pointed by the court"—although the time at which this occurs varies tre-
mendously. I n some jurisdictions, a lawyer is appointed when the proposed 
patient is first admitted or soon after; in others, the lawyer is not appointed 
until minutes before the actual court hearing. There is general agreement 
that an appointed attorney is entitled, upon request, to adequate time to 
prepare a defense. 
I t is useful to discuss the way in which a lawyer might function in each of 
the three identifiable stages of the litigation process: the pretrial stage lasting 
from initial admission to the beginning of the hearing, the hearing itself, and 
the post-hearing appeal process. 
Pre-hearing 
Counsel's first duty during the prehearing stage is fu l l investigation of the 
facts. This study requires a careful examination of any hospital or medical 
records concerning the proposed patient, of course, and consultation with any 
hospital personnel who are involved with the proposed patient. I n addition, 
counsel should usually make an independent investigation of the events 
leading to the demands for the proposed patient s hospitalization. This search 
w i l l generally require interviewing persons in the community, especially 
those seeking the proposed patient's commitment. The lawyer should be alert 
to factors bearing upon the proposed patient's ability to survive in the com-
munity and to any potential resources that may not yet have been utilized 
to the fullest possible extent. Given ( 1 ) the increasing recognition that the 
need for hospitalization is often as much a function of the proposed patient's 
social and community situation as of his clinical pathology and ( 2 ) the diffi-
culty that institutional staff members often have in making a full investigation 
of the community situation, counsel can serve his cKent wel l by stressing 
this aspect of the pretrial investigation. 
I f the proposed patient has been hospitalized and an evaluation w i l l take 
place during this prehearing period, the lawyer should also consider seeking 
permission to attend the meeting of the institution's staff at which the pro-
posed patient w i l l be discussed. Efforts to establish a legal right to attend 
such staffings have generally failed. But some institutions, at least, permit 
and even encourage lawyers' attendance. More might do so if it were demon-
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strated that a lawyer's presence and even active participation need not be 
disruptive. T h e lawyer should recognize that these staffings are not the place 
for courtroom theatrics. Rather, he should offer information which the staff 
may not have had an opportunity to gather and point out those aspects of the 
situation that favor the proposed patient. This is also an opportunity to gather 
information that might be useful if the matter does go to a formal hearing. 
I f there is disagreement among the staff members as to the recommendation 
to make, counsel should note those staff persons appearing to favor the pro-
posed patient and should consider them for possible use later as witnesses. 
Attention also should be given to the facts and information considered by 
the staff in arriving at their conclusions; this may be useful in cross examin-
ing any staff members who testify at trial. 
During this prehearing period, the lawyer can also undertake to make hos-
pitalization or even court-ordered outpatient care unnecessary. Placements 
that w i l l be accepted voluntarily by a proposed patient who acknowledges a 
need for assistance but resists hospitalization in a psychiatric facility can 
sometimes be located. Nursing home facilities, for example, are often more 
appropriate for elderly persons than state hospital placements. Whi le institu-
tional staff members may have formal responsibility for examining alterna-
tives to full-time hospitalization, the lawyer cannot rely upon their conclu-
sions that no such alternatives are available. T h e understaffing of many 
institutions means that social workers and others are sometimes unable to 
make as thorough a scrutiny of community resources as is desirable. To some 
extent, the practice of law here as elsewhere necessarily also involves the 
practice of social work. 
Throughout this prehearing period, the attorney should be in contact wi th 
the proposed patient and counselling him. H e should advise the proposed 
patient concerning the wisdom of resisting treatment, but only after obtain-
ing sufficient information to make this counsel soundly based. A continuing 
effort must be made to preserve the proposed patient's ability to make as free 
choice as possible concerning whether or not to resist the proceedings. 
Special attention should be given the need to advise the proposed patient 
concerning "going voluntary," i.e., admitting himself to hospitalization on a 
voluntary basis. I n some situations, of course, this is a desirable course of 
action and defense counsel should so advise the proposed patient. I f hos-
pitalization is inevitable, there is evidence that it w i l l be more beneficial for 
the patient i f it is accomplished on a voluntary basis. Staff members tend to 
be more favorably inclined towards voluntary patients, and staff attitude may 
have a significant effect upon the benefits a patient derives from hospitali-
zation. However, the attorney must exercise caution to prevent both the 
lawyer and the proposed patient from uncritical acceptance of voluntary 
admission as the "easy way out" of a situation that may be painful for both. 
Defense counsel should be alert to frequent informal pressures by family 
or staff that sometimes render voluntary admissions voluntary only in label. 
Patients are sometimes advised that formal hearing w i l l only result in com-
mitment and therefore voluntary admission is simply the easiest method 
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of accommodating the inevitable. This may, of course, be correct. But the 
attorney should make full investigation before so advising the proposed 
patient and should stress that if the proposed patient wishes to resist despite 
the unfavorable prognosis the lawyer w i l l assist him fully. 
The lawyer should also be certain that the proposed patient understands 
the legal effect of a voluntary admission. I n most jurisdictions, a so-called 
voluntary patient may be retained in the hospital for a limited period of time 
after formal notice of intent to leave is given. During this period, involuntary 
commitment proceedings may be begun. Thus , it is important that the 
proposed patient realize that after voluntary admission he is not free to leave 
the facility upon request and may, in fact, not be able to leave it even after 
giving notice the required period in advance. 
T h e lawyer also should be aware of the increasing evidence that hospitali-
zation often is not only unnecessary but may be harmful to the proposed 
patient. I t may reduce the person's incentive to adjust to community life. 
B y breaking already tenuous ties to community resources such as jobs, it may 
increase the difficulty of such adjustment. The proposed patient's family and 
the institutional staff are unlikely to present a fully balanced picture of the 
merits and disadvantages of hospitalization. The lawyer should seek to 
balance this, even if the task requires that he play the role of "devil's advo-
cate" to some extent. 
I f the proposed patient does elect to admit himself on a voluntary basis, 
the attorney should not regard his responsibility as fully discharged. Given 
the danger that informal pressures may prevent a voluntary patient from ex-
ercising his right to leave the institution—or at least to attempt to leave and 
thereby require the staff to pursue formal commitment proceedings—the law-
yer should regard himself as having a continuing duty to assure that the 
patient remains aware of his legal status and as free as possible to exercise 
legal options. This fact need not interfere with treatment efforts. I n fact, 
many mental health personnel would argue that the continuing and active 
iterest of a person in the community—such as a lawer fulfilling the responsi-
bility suggested above—is likely to encourage the patient to continue to pur-
sue the goal of return to the community. 
Hearing 
I f the matter goes to a formal hearing, the role of defense counsel changes 
somewhat. While still an advocate, the lawyer has—temporarily at least— 
exhausted the possible benefits to be derived from negotiation and must 
shift to traditional litigation skills. Recent legislation, judicial decisions, and 
empirical studies of the diagnostic and treatment processes combine to create 
numerous opportunities for a vigorous lawyer to use on behalf of a proposed 
patient in this context. 
F irs t , the lawyer may assert a number of established or developing pro-
cedural rights of the proposed patient. These are generally rights regarded 
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by those who favor them as ultimately assuring increased accuracy in mental 
health litigation. T o achieve maximum effectiveness, they must be made 
available in al l cases even ff in some they appear to accomplish little in terms 
of accuracy of outcome. A lawyer may, then, assert that his client's rights 
were violated and his client is entitled to have the proceedings dismissed even 
i f there was no apparent danger that in this case the violation did or would 
result in an inaccurate result. Some of those rights an attorney might reason-
ably seek to assert are as follows: 
Invalid Emergency Detention. Counsel might argue that the proposed pa-
tient's emergency detention was invalid, either because no actual need for 
immediate detention existed or—ff the detention was under a court order— 
the judge who issued the order did not have sufficient information at that 
time to make a realiable determination that such a need existed. Since the 
period of emergency detention ends with the formal hearing, the lawyer may 
argue, the only way to deter such improper detentions is to prohibit use of 
any information obtained during the emergency detention. Thus , counsel may 
object to the testimony of a psychiatrist who examined the proposed patient 
during the period of emergency detention on the ground that the psychia-
trist's testimony was "tainted" by the illegality of the detention and should not 
be heard. 
Inadequate Notice. Proposed patients have traditionally been served, be-
fore the hearing, with notice that a petition for their commitment has been 
filed, that a hearing w i l l be held, and the time and place of the hearing. De -
fense counsel can argue, however, that this minimal notice is insufficient to 
permit the preparation of an adequate defense. I t can be argued that the pro-
posed patient and his attorney are entitled to advance notice of the specific 
reasons why it w i l l be asserted the proposed patient is subject to involuntary 
treatment, the names of those persons who w i l l testify, and the substance of 
their testimony. Only if this information is provided and only i f the petitioner 
is required to limit himself to those matters can the defense adequately 
prepare in the short time available to test the accuracy of the witnesses* 
testimony. 
Right Against Self-incrimination. T h e F i f th Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination protects a person from being compelled to give information 
orally that would in any way tend to result in conviction of a crime. Defense 
counsel can argue that since conviction of a crime and involuntary mental 
health treatment both involve deprivation of liberty, "incrimination" should 
be read as also including "involuntary treatment." Thus a proposed patient 
can be said to have a legal right to avoid giving information that would tend 
to cause him to be committed. Defense counsel can argue that at the hearing 
the proposed patient cannot be called as a witness by the petitioner and com-
pelled, under threat of contempt of court, to give testimony supporting the 
petitioner's case. Further, counsel can argue that a prehearing psychiatric 
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interview violated this right unless the attorney was present to assure that the 
proposed patient was aware of this right or some other precautions were 
taken to assure that the proposed patient knew of the right to refuse to answer 
and how to assert it . 
Right to he Present. I n some jurisdictions, the hearing can be held without 
the proposed patient i f there is medical testimony that the proposed patient's 
presence would be harmful to him. Defense counsel can argue that due 
process requires that the proposed patient be given the option to be present 
even if this might result in discomfort to him. Only i f the proposed patient is 
present and hears the testimony can the lawyer learn which portions of the 
testimony should be attacked. There is, defense counsel can assert, no reliable 
evidence that a proposed patient s presence at a hearing w i l l result in long-
term impairment of recovery capacity, although presence may quite ob-
viously be temporarily upsetting. 
Right to Confront Witnesses. T h e Sixth Amendment right to confront wit -
nesses produced against one, defense counsel can argue, applies to civi l com-
mitment hearings as wel l as criminal trials. As a consequence, the court 
should hear no evidence as to what a person said unless the witness makes 
the statement in open court and is subject to cross examination concerning 
the accuracy of the statement. I f , for example, a psychiatrist offers during his 
testimony to relate what the proposed patient's family told him about an i n -
cident involving the patient, defense counsel might object on the ground that 
this amounts to having the proposed patient's family testify and is permissible 
only i f the family members themselves appear in court, testify to the incident, 
and subject themselves to cross examination concerning the accuracy of their 
testimony. 
Burden of Proof. I n many jurisdictions, it is unclear what measure of burden 
of proof is or should be imposed upon one seeking to submit another person to 
involuntary treatment. I n ordinary litigation, the party seeking relief need 
only prove his case by "the preponderance of the evidence." This means that 
more—but only slightly more—evidence must favor his own version of the 
facts than favors his opponent's version. I n criminal prosecutions and i n pro-
ceedings to declare a juvenile delinquent, the defendant's (or the youth's) 
guilt must be proved by evidence **beyond a reasonable doubt." I t can be 
argued that in mental health proceedings due process of law requires proof 
that the proposed patient meets the statutory criterion "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" or at least proof that meets the slightly less stringent standard of "clear 
and convincing" evidence. Opponents of these high burdens of proof argue 
that given the difficulty of diagnosis and predicting behavior, these burdens 
place an impossible task upon those seeking hospitalization of another. But 
counsel for a proposed patient can argue that because of the danger of inac-
curate diagnosis and predictions created by the state of the art, it is especially 
important to assure that the proof is especially reliable before it is used to 
deprive a person of liberty. 
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Other procedural rights may be asserted, of course. The often-complex 
requirements of local law may provide numerous opportunities to make such 
arguments. What is important to note, however, is that most of these pro-
cedural rights are designed to increase the adversary nature of the hearing by 
enabling the proposed patient's lawyer to prepare more effectively to chal-
lenge testimony produced by the petitioner. Underlying the arguments for 
these rights, then, is the assumption that the more adversary the hearing, the 
more likely it is to produce an accurate outcome. 
A second kind of challenge a lawyer may raise deals with the standards 
for determining what persons are subject to involuntary treatment. T w o 
challenges are often possible. The constitutional requirement of due process 
demands that standards used by the law be sufficiently precise in order that 
it can be determined before one acts what behavior w i l l result in legal 
liability and in order that it can be determined during litigation of a case 
what facts it is necessary to show in order to win . Defense counsel may argue 
that the criteria provided by statute are so unclear as to be unconstitutionally 
vague. I f the statute requires proof that the proposed patient is "dangerous 
to himself," defense counsel may argue that it is unclear whether it is neces-
sary to prove that the proposed patient w i l l , if not treated, do immediate 
physical harm to himself. The statute does not clearly indicate whether it is 
sufficient that the petitioner prove that if not treated the proposed patient 
w i l l experience a decline in mental—and perhaps physical—^health over a 
sustained period of time. The lawyer may also challenge the criteria as un -
constitutionally "overboard." I t can be argued that some reasons for which 
hospitalization might be sought are so insubstantial that to hospitalize a 
person on that basis violates basic due process rights. I n O'Conner v. Donald-
son, for example, the United States Supreme Court stated that mentally i l l 
persons could not be hospitalized simply because hospitalization would "en-
sure them a living standard superior to that they enjoy in the private com-
munity" or to save other people from "exposure to those whose ways are 
different." To hospitalize a mentally i l l person on such insubstantial grounds, 
the Court held, would violate "every man's constitutional right to liberty." 
Defense counsel may argue that if the statute requires only proof that the 
proposed patient is "dangerous to himself," this pennits hospitalization only 
because the person is not able to maintain a middle-class living standard and 
therefore the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad. I f the court is unwilling 
to hold the commitment statute invalid, defense counsel may argue for a 
favorable interpretation of it . Ambiguities in the statutory standard, it can be 
asserted, must be resolved by interpretation so that the standard is a mean-
ingful criterion for use in deciding the case before the court. 
He may, for example, argue that if the statute requires proof that the pro-
posed patient is "dangerous to himself," the court should interpret this for 
purposes of the case as requiring that the proposed patient would commit 
suicide if not hospitalized. The court may regard it as necessary to interpret 
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the statute narrowly and specifically to blunt defense counsel's arguments of 
vagueness and overbreadth. 
T h i r d , the lawyer m a y — i n those jurisdictions in which the right is avail -
able—assist the proposed patient in invoking the right to trial by jury. Th is 
procedure, however, is likely to be less effective than is commonly assumed. 
While lawyers' views concerning jury decision-making are based upon im-
pressionistic observations during trials, most trial attorneys would agree that 
a jury is usually less desirable in a "close" commitment case than a conscien-
tious trial judge. Such cases require the person or persons making the de-
cision to put aside natural humanitarian impulses and objectively apply a 
moderately technical criterion. I t is likely that jurors are more likely than a 
trial judge to be swayed by the irrelevant but appealing emotional aspects of 
the close case. Nevertheless, in many jurisdictions the right to jury trial is an 
important part of the process. There appears to be general agreement that if 
jury trial is available, the decision as to whether or not to invoke it should be 
that of the proposed patient himself. Counsel, however, should offer advice 
concerning the impact of invoking the right or waiving it as wel l as offering 
professional opinion as to wisdom of alternative courses of action. 
A fourth kind of effort that an attorney can undertake at trial—perhaps the 
most important one—is vigorous challenge of the petitioner's expert wi t -
nesses. Petitioners' evidence in c ivi l commitment cases has traditionally been 
primarily the testimony of experts such as psychiatrists and psychologists. 
Usually witnesses are permitted only to testffy to their opinions concerning 
matters within their field of expertise. These expert opinions have been the 
traditional and major source of evidence supporting c iv i l commitments. But 
recent efforts to evaluate the accuracy of clinical judgments provide defense 
counsel with potentially effective tools to attack this testimony. 
Several types of attack may be made. Defense counsel may challenge a 
witness's expertise and ask that the court not regard the witness as an expert 
qualified to express an opinion. For example, a psychiatrist may offer to testify 
that a proposed patient is, in his opinion, likely to assault other persons and 
therefore is dangerous. Defense counsel may, while acknowledging the wi t -
ness's expertise on diagnosis and treatment, argue that the witness does not 
possess demonstrable skills in predicting behavior. H e may cite studies of 
persons diagnosed as dangerous by mental health professionals but never-
theless released by courts. When followed up, fewer than one-half of these 
persons were found to have committed serious assaultive crimes. 
I f defense counsel is not successful in preventing a witness from being 
qualified as an expert, there are still alternative grounds for attack. T r a -
ditionally, experts have been asked simply to state their conclusions and little 
more. The lawyer for a proposed patient may, however, demand on cross ex-
amination that the witness explain in great detail the facts relied upon in 
forming that opinion and the reasoning process by which the witness pro-
gressed from those facts to the ultimate opinion. This procedure may open 
several further opportunities. F u l l disclosure of the facts and reasoning 
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process may convince the judge or jury that the expert really does not have 
sufficient information or reasoning abilities to justify the acceptance of his 
opinion. Or, defense counsel may be able to show that some of the facts relied 
upon by the expert were incorrect and thus convince the judge or jury that 
the opinion is therefore unreliable. I f , for example, the expert knowledges 
relying upon a report that a proposed patient made an unprovoked assault 
upon another person, defense counsel may prove that the assault was in fact 
provoked. This point may lay the groundwork for an argument that the 
opinion should not be weighed heavily. 
A witness may also be asked to defend his testimony in light of what de-
fense counsel presents as the opinions of recognized experts or the results of 
authoritative studies. Defense counsel may use this technique in an effort to 
establish that the witness's opinion is not adequately supported by generally-
recognized professional standards or authorities and therefore should not be 
given weight. 
A witness who has testified that a proposed patient suffers from a certain 
illness—such as schizophrenia—may be questioned concerning the likelihood 
that another expert would agree with this diagnosis. Defense counsel may be 
able to relate the results of studies showing what some persons regard as a 
distressingly low rate of agreement among different diagnosticians and to 
query the witness concerning what basis he has for believing his diagnosis to 
be freer from professional dispute than those studied in the research. A psy-
chiatrist who has testified that a proposed patient w i l l , if not hospitalized, 
assault other persons may be asked about followup studies of persons regarded 
as dangerous. He may be queried as to whether he regards his prediction as 
more accurate than those predictions studied and—if he responds affirma-
tively—questioned as to why he does so. H e may also be read the written 
opinions of a variety of generally recognized experts in the field of mental 
health to the effect that dangerousness cannot be predicted. He may then be 
asked to explain how he can assert the contrary. 
A psychiatrist who has testified that a proposed patient "needs hospitali-
zation" can be asked about studies of persons who have left psychiatric hos-
pitals against medical advice. Followup comparison of these persons with 
others who remained hospitalized until evaluated by the staff as ready to 
leave show no significant difference in adjustment to community life. T h e 
witness can be asked whether these studies show that the need for hospitali-
zation—or continued hospitalization—cannot be accurately determined and 
to explain how the study results affect his assertion that he can predict this. 
Although the extent to which a lawyer w i l l be permitted to use such studies 
and items from the professional literature as wel l as the manner in which he 
w i l l be able to present them differ from state to state, the increasing literature 
reporting empirical tests of clinical judgment is everywhere, to some degree, 
a potentially valuable tool for a lawyer seeking to perform the role of ad-
vocate. 
A final possible effort defense counsel might use is the presentation of an 
affirmative case for the position that the proposed patient does not meet the 
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statutory standard. I n theory, a proposed patient is required to produce no 
"defense" but may rely solely upon the argument that the petitioner has 
failed to meet his burden of proving that the proposed patient meets the 
statutory standard. But as a practical matter, some affirmative evidence con-
tradicting that of the petitioner is probably essential if the petitioner has 
made any significant showing at al l . 
Several kinds of evidence might be produced on behalf of a proposed pa-
tient. Expert testimony that the proposed patient is not mentally i l l or, if 
mentally i l l , does not meet the statutory standard is valuable but difficult to 
obtain in many jurisdictions. I f the proposed patient has been evaluated at an 
institution, the attorney should inquire as to whether any members of the staff 
disagreed with the ultimate recommendation that the proposed patient be 
hospitalized. Any such dissidents are potential defense witnesses, and their 
view should be investigated. 
Defense counsel may also call lay witnesses to testify concerning the pro-
posed patient's abihty to survive in the community. Experience has taught 
that even severely i l l persons are often able to live and function in the com-
munity despite substantial impairments. I n manv cases, the proposed patient 
w i l l have lived in community despite symptoms no less severe than those 
present at the time of the hearing. I n such cases, defense counsel might call 
as witnesses persons who dealt with the proposed patient in the community 
and who are wil l ing to testify that, from their experience, the proposed pa-
tient—although ill—^has been able to get bv in the past. Neighbors and 
relatives might be considered, and even tradepersons or storekeepers with 
whom the proposed patient did business might be valuable sources of defense 
testimony. 
T h e question of whether the proposed patient should himself take the 
witness stand and testify is often a difficult one. I f the proposed patient does 
testify, he is subject to cross examination bv counsel for the petitioner, and, 
this procedure may prove devastating;. Exhibition of bizarre behavior in the 
courtroom is likely to be fatal for the defense case. On the other hand, it is 
essential to a successful defense that the proposed patient convey to the 
judge or jury the impression of being able to function reasonably wel l . I n 
some cases, this can be done by demonstrating an ability to testify in his own 
behalf—and to stand up under cross examination. But in other cases, defense 
counsel might reasonably conclude that the same objective can be accom-
plished by having the proposed patient talk with the attorney in the court-
room and otherwise appear—without actually testifying—to be actively 
participating in the litigation. The ultimate decision as to whether or not to 
testify should be that of the proposed patient. But counsel should not be re-
luctant to offer information on the likely effect of testifying or not, as wel l as 
an opinion as to which course of conduct would be wiser. 
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Appeal 
I n most jurisdictions, a proposed patient who is ordered by a trial court to 
submit to treatment may appeal this decision to at least one higher appellate 
court. Traditionally, however, such appeals have not been an effective pro-
cedure for the patient. One reason is mechanical. Preparation of the docu-
ments for appeal—especially the transcription of the trial testimony—often 
requires a substantial period of time. Generally, appellate courts w i l l not 
consider an appeal that is "moot," i.e., that involves a matter that no longer 
makes any difference to the parties of the lawsuit. Given the frequent use of 
short-term hospitalization, it is common for a committed patient to be dis-
charged before an appeal can be taken, with the result that already expended 
efforts to secure an appellate ruling are for naught. E v e n where the likely 
duration of hospitalization is uncertain, the danger that the case w i l l become 
moot discourages many lawyers from beginning the appeal process. 
Another reason appeals have not been effective has been the attitude of 
appellate courts. Generally, an appellate court wi l l reverse the decision of a 
trial court i f any substantial error was commited during the trial , such as the 
admission of inadmissible evidence or an erroneous or incomplete instruction 
to the jury as to how they should consider the matter. But when a trial has 
been held before a judge rather than a jury appellate courts require a sig-
nificantly more important error before they w i l l reverse the trial court. 
Mental health proceedings are usually conducted before a judge, and, there-
fore, the task of persuading an appellate court to reverse a commitment is a 
difficult one. Moreover, i f it is clear that the proposed patient was seriously 
i l l and that hospitalization was sought in good faith, there is a discernable 
tendency upon the part of appellate courts to ignore errors that would gen-
erally be regarded as requiring reversal and to affirm the trial court. Not only 
has it been difficult to get mental health cases before appellate courts, but 
once there it has been difficult to persuade the court to reverse the commit-
ment for even acknowledged errors. 
However, there is a need for more frequent consideration of mental health 
cases by appellate courts. Wide gaps exist in the law applicable to mental 
health proceedings, and many matters—such as the arguably vague standards 
for commitment—clearly need definitive consideration by appellate judges. 
Moreover, many present statutes are outdated and are subject to attack on 
constitutional grounds, yet action by the legislature is often difficult to stimu-
late until an appellate court has declared the statute unconstitutional. T h e 
mental health litigation system is sorely in need of the broad supervision that 
can be accomplished only by frequent and careful consideration of trial court 
decisions by an appellate tribunal. 
Both lawyers and appellate judges are beginning to realize this fact. During 
the last several years, a discernable increase can be noted in the willingness 
of appellate courts to ignore mootness and carefully to consider arguments 
raised by appealing mental patients. Perhaps most important to the activist 
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lawyers has been the courts' increased willingness critically to evaluate expert 
testimony and reverse commitments where the evidence, considered care-
fully, does not adequately support the proposition that the proposed patient 
meets the statutory criteria. A Texas appellate court reflected this trend when 
it recently reversed the commitment of a proposed patient on the ground that 
the expert witnesses had testified only to their ultimate conclusions. I f the 
jury was to make a meaningful evaluation of the evidence, the court rea-
soned, the factual basis for the experts* conclusions as wel l as the conclusions 
themselves should be before the jury: 
Expert testimony that a person's condition has been diagnosed as 
"chronic schizophrenia" or "paranoid state" does not advise the jury 
whether hospitalization is necessary. Neither does an opinion that a 
person is "potentially dangerous," without more, warrant confine-
ment, i f that person has never done violence to himself or anyone 
else. Unless opinions such as these are supported by statements of 
the behavior on which they are based, the court does not have suffi-
cient information to make a proper legal determination of whether 
the potential harm is great enough to justify depriving the person of 
his liberty. 
Moss v. State, 539 S.W.2d 549-50 (Tex . C iv . App.—Dal las 1976, no w r i t ) . 
I f appellate judges review mental health cases with the attitude reflected 
in the language used by the Texas court, appellate review is likely to become 
an effective vehicle for remedying specific improper commitments and for 
providing supervision of the commitment process as a system. The mechani-
cal barriers can be overcome. Appeals of this sort can be expedited and the 
time required to prepare the papers shortened. Appellate courts can be urged 
to ignore the fact of a patient's release, on the ground that the commitment 
still imposes a stigma on the former patient and has collateral consequences 
such as reducing employment opportunities. There is every reason to believe 
that lawyers performing as effective advocates w i l l soon—where they have 
not yet—^make long strides towards making the appeal process a meaningful 
part of mental health litigation. 
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Conclusion 
Stimulated by judicial demands and critical reexamination of traditional 
professional standards, lawyers representing proposed patients in mental 
health proceedings are tending to redefine their role, which has traditionally 
been primarily one of guardianship of the client. A n ultimate duty to serve as 
advocate of the wishes of the proposed patient is being recognized, although 
this realization should supplement rather than replace the obligation to advise 
and counsel the client as to the wisdom of resisting treatment. While lawyers 
redefining their role continue to regard courtroom advocacy as an important 
part of the services they can provide, they are also recognizing the need to 
negotiate informally for their cHents during the prehearing stages of a pro-
ceeding. Considerable barriers still preclude widespread acceptance of this 
advocate-negotiator role, and it is far from universally accepted. 
Those lawyers who do accept this role, however, find that mental health 
litigation provides numerous opportunities to implement that function. Par-
ticipation in the prehearing stage permits informal negotiation for dismissal 
of the proceedings, settlement on some form of mutually agreeable treatment 
or assistance, and preparation for eventual litigation. I f the case reaches the 
hearing stage, numerous developing and well-established procedural rights 
can be asserted. I n addition, recent efforts to develop empirical information 
concerning the accuracy of diagnoses, treatment prognoses, and behavior 
prediction provide material that can sometimes be used effectively to chal-
lenge or refute expert testimony offered in court. F inal ly , the process of ap-
peal to a higher court is becoming a meaningful one, and this choice opens 
upon another forum in which a hitherto unsuccessful advocate can pursue the 
interests of his client. 
Utilization of these opportunities by defense counsel is unquestionably an 
irritation to many mental health personnel and a major barrier to useful inter-
disciplinary communication. I n large part, this is because many of the per-
vasive changes that have occurred in the delivery of nonvoluntary mental 
health care in the last decade become of practical significance to mental 
health personnel only when asserted by such lawyers on behalf of specific 
proposed patients. 
Underlying much of the disagreement between the new activist lawyers 
and mental health personnel is a basic difference in philosophical perspective. 
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Relying largely upon assumptions concerning the value to be given individual 
choice, the activist lawyers are attempting to develop a system that w i l l sub-
ject to programs of nonvoluntary care and treatment only a small subgroup 
of those who would in fact benefit from such treatment. Insofar as they are 
successful, they interfere wi th traditional notions of delivery of mental health 
care in a manner that is directly disruptive to mental health programs based 
on different assumptions. 
Undoubtedly there w i l l have to be accommodation i n the future. Although 
there are many imsettled legal issues in the mental health field, there can be 
little doubt that the adversary process w i l l continue to be the model on which 
mental health litigation must be conducted. On the other hand, the constitu-
tional necessity and general wisdom of narrow criteria for involuntary treat-
ment are subject to greater doubt. The discomfort which many lawyers ex-
perience in implementing these narrow standards indicates that further dis-
cussion of appropriate criteria is probably the most fruitful area of future 
interdisciplinary discussion. I f lawyers and mental health professionals can 
arrive at a mutually acceptable criterion for involuntary treatment, imple-
menting that criterion by means of a vigorous adversary system is likely to be 
much less distressing to mental health personnel than the present situation. 
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